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Effective Macroprudential Policy: Cross-Sector
Substitution from Price and Quantity Measures
Macroprudential policy is increasingly being implemented worldwide, and is
mostly applied to banks. A key question is whether this prompts substitution
toward nonbank credit. Using two different global data sets on macropru-
dential measures and different methodologies, including detrended series,
panel estimations, and propensity score matching, we find evidence of such
substitution. Substitution toward nonbank credit appears to be stronger when
policy measures are binding and are implemented in economies with well-
developed nonbank credit markets. This substitution partially offsets the fall
in bank credit, thus dampening the policies’ effect on total credit.
JEL codes: E58, G10, G18, G20, G58
Keywords: financial cycle, macroprudential regulation, financial
supervision, (shadow) banking.
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY IS ALIVE and kicking. It is being used
actively both in emerging market economies and—following the financial crisis—in
advanced economies.1 This includes measures that apply directly to lenders, such
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as countercyclical capital buffers or capital surcharges, and restrictions that apply to
borrowers, such as loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-to-income (DTI) ratio caps. Most
macroprudential measures implemented around the globe between 2000 and 2013
apply to the banking sector only, including the borrower-based measures (IMF 2013).
Yet, the predominant application of macroprudential policies (MaPs) to banks
may be subject to a boundary problem, causing substitution flows to less regulated
parts of the financial sector. As noted by Goodhart (2008), “the more effective
regulation is, the greater the incentive to find ways around it.” This concern also
applies to MaPs. Several papers have already estimated the intended effects of MaPs
on variables such as banking credit and housing prices (e.g., Morgan, Regis, and
Salike 2015, Cerutti, Claessens, and Laeven 2017, Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey
2018), and whether measures “leak” through foreign banks (Aiyar, Calomiris, and
Wieladek 2014, Reinhardt and Sowerbutts 2015, Frost, van Horen, and de Haan
2017, Cerutti and Zhou 2018). Such substitution effects across sectors have not yet
been tested empirically in a cross-country setting. This paper aims to fill this gap, by
estimating the effect of MaPs on nonbank credit to the nonfinancial private sector.2
Testing the effect of MaPs on various types of credit provides information of its
effects in addressing the credit cycle, but not its ultimate effect on the probability and
severity of a financial crisis.
Measuring the effects of MaPs on bank credit is subject to endogeneity problems,
as MaP decisions are taken in response to credit and financial cycles. Focusing on the
side effects of MaPs, as we do, lessens these concerns, as developments in nonbank
credit are unlikely to have a major influence on MaPs that apply to banks. Still, policy
measures may not be completely orthogonal to developments in nonbank credit, as
nonbank credit may be correlated with bank credit, and may thus influence policy
decisions due to its effect on total credit. We try to address this by using generalized
method of moments (GMM) estimation techniques and conditioning the effect of
MaPs on nonbank credit on the effect of MaPs on bank credit. In addition, we address
endogeneity by applying propensity score matching (PSM), which works in two
steps, starting with explaining policy action as a left-hand side variable. Whereas
the panel regressions capture the effect on nonbank credit growth after policy action,
PSM compares nonbank credit growth between similar treatment (with MaPs) and
control (without MaPs) groups. Another advantage of PSM is that it does not rely on
a baseline specification for nonbank credit.
The boundary hypothesis predicts that more binding constraints lead to stronger
substitution effects. We therefore test the substitution effects conditional on the effect
on bank credit. We check whether the results differ for advanced economies (AEs)
versus emerging market economies (EMEs), which differ in their degree of financial
development and especially the depth of their nonbank credit markets. Moreover, next
to a global database with yearly observations of MaPs, we corroborate the results
with quarterly observations on prudential measures (PMs), which represent a broader
2. Total credit consists of bank loans, nonbank loans and debt securities. See Section 1 for further
details.
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category of policy tools including (microprudential) bank capital requirements. Fi-
nally, we test whether results differ before and after the global financial crisis (GFC).
We find indications of substitution (or “waterbed”) effects in all of the method-
ologies and samples used, although the results differ across specifications and are
subject to substantial margins of uncertainty. Results are more robust for AEs, where
the size of nonbank credit is much larger than in EMEs so that there are more options
for substitution toward nonbank credit. For the simple detrending method, we find
that after 2 years, nonbank credit is roughly 8 percentage points (pp) above the trend
following the application of MaPs in AEs, conditional on a decline in the growth
rate in bank credit (as a first proxy for the degree to which MaPs were binding on
bank credit).3 Our panel regressions, which control for the impact of other variables
on nonbank credit growth, suggest that substitution effects only occur in AEs and
when quantity constraints are applied. Overall, during the whole period after pol-
icy measures are activated, annual nonbank credit growth is estimated to be 1.8 pp
higher for MaPs and 0.5 pp higher for PMs. This is still a substantial effect relative
to average yearly nonbank credit growth of 7.3% in AEs (i.e., it would rise to 9.1%
on average after the activation of MaPs). Finally, when we zoom in on individual
measures and match treatment and nontreatment groups using PSM, the cumulative
effect on yearly nonbank credit growth is up to 9 pp above the baseline during the
2 years after activation for AEs, that is, comparable to the conditional detrending
method. The higher magnitude during the first 2 years suggests that the bulk of the
substitution effect is in the first years after implementation, as the long-run effect on
credit growth as measured in the panel regression is smaller.
Our paper builds on a wider literature on MaP. While the concept of macropruden-
tial policy can be traced back at least to the late 1970s (Clement 2010), it has become a
common part of the policy lexicon in the first decade of this millennium. The crisis has
led not only to much more interest in the macroprudential approach, but also to active
use of macroprudential instruments around the world. Galati and Moessner (2013,
2017) provide an overview of the literature, emphasizing the objectives, instruments,
and analytical underpinnings of the macroprudential approach. This is motivated by
market failures and externalities that may lead to systemic risk, generally defined as
the risk of a disruption in the financial system that is large enough to have serious
negative effects on the real economy. Our focus is on MaPs that address the time
dimension of systemic risk, that is, the endogenous build-up of systemic risk over the
financial cycle (Borio 2014).4
Recently, the active use of instruments has spawned a growing empirical literature
on the effectiveness of MaPs, both in individual country or regional cases and in
global panels (Arregui et al., 2013). The most comprehensive approach is that of
Cerutti, Claessens, and Laeven (2017), who use an IMF survey to document MaPs
3. Throughout the paper, we refer to a change in (nominal) volumes with percentages (%), and to
differences between percentage changes using pp.
4. The cross-section dimension of systemic risk captures interconnections in financial networks that
may transmit instability through the financial system and to the real economy.
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for 119 countries over the 2000–13 period. They find that the implementation of such
instruments is generally associated with the intended downward impact on credit,
with most emphasis on bank credit, but that the effects are weaker in financially
more developed and open economies. Bruno and Shin (2014) find that MaPs em-
ployed in Korea to deal with the effects of cross-border capital flows—such as the
“macroprudential levy”—helped to reduce the sensitivity of capital flows into Korea
to global conditions. Krznar and Morsink (2014) establish that recent rounds of MaP
tightening in Canada have reduced mortgage credit growth and house price growth.
Glocker and Towbin (2015) show that an increase in reserve requirements leads to a
contraction in domestic credit, a depreciation of the exchange rate, a current account
improvement, and an increase in prices. Lim et al. (2011) show that for 49 countries
reviewed, MaPs helped to reduce procyclicality, meaning a reduced sensitivity of
credit conditions to GDP growth. Gambacorta and Murcia (2017) use granular credit
registry data and show that MaPs have been quite effective in stabilizing credit cycles
in the Americas region. Altunbas, Binici, and Gambacorta (2018) demonstrate that
the use of MaP reduces bank risk taking.
Because of the inherent difficulties in establishing the effects of measures at a
macro level, a number of studies have used microlevel data on behavioral effects
of MaPs. For example, Kim, Plosser, and Santos (2018) find that nonbanks in the
U.S. increased their leveraged loan activity following the interagency guidance in
2013—and increased their bank borrowing—while large banks cut back leveraged
loans. Jiménez et al. (2017) investigate bank-specific shocks and show that Spain’s
dynamic provisioning requirements helped to smooth cycles in the supply of credit.
With Korean data on housing and mortgage activity, Igan and Kang (2011) find
that the tightening of DTI and LTV limits have a significant and sizeable impact on
transaction activity and house price appreciation.
Our empirical framework builds on research that has sought to explain credit
growth, for instance to understand credit rationing and the monetary transmission
mechanism (Gertler and Gilchrist 1991, Berger and Udell 1992, Kashyap, Stein,
and Wilcox 1993). In line with Frost and van Tilburg (2014), we control for macro-
economic fundamentals to filter out the effects of policy on credit growth in a cross-
country panel setting.
Our results do not tell whether substitution effects reduce or increase systemic
risks. The former outcome may be expected, as risks may shift to institutions that are
less leveraged, less connected to payments infrastructure, and less subject to maturity
mismatch. But this need not be the case, as market failures and systemic risks may also
arise outside the regulated banking sector. Specifically, nonbank financial institutions
may contribute to procyclical leverage (Adrian and Shin 2009, 2010), may amplify
the impact of price changes and flows (Feroli et al., 2014), and may be subject to
misaligned incentives that influence the overall risk in the system (Rajan 2006).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the data. Section 2
investigates differences from trends in credit following policy events. Section 3
presents panel regressions. Section 4 also applies a PSM that compares developments
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in nonbank credit following MaP activation with those in matched control groups.
Section 3.2 presents robustness checks and Section 5 concludes.
1. DATA
The analysis in this paper is based on three types of country-level data: (i) infor-
mation on bank and nonbank credit, (ii) the dates and types of macroprudential and
broader prudential policy measures, and (iii) macrofinancial control variables.
1.1 Private Credit to the Nonfinancial Sector
Our measures of bank and nonbank credit come from the BIS long series database
on private nonfinancial sector credit (Dembiermont, Drehmann, and Muksakunratana
2013). The database contains quarterly series of private credit data for 40 economies
for a period covering the last 40 years. The measure of private credit covers all loans
and debt securities to nonfinancial corporations, households, and nonprofit institutions
serving households. Bank credit is defined as all loans and debt securities held by
domestic and foreign banks domestically (subsidiaries and branches). Nonbank credit
encompasses loans and debt securities held by all other sectors of the economy (e.g.,
insurers, pension funds, investment funds, other firms, households, etc.) and, for some
countries, direct cross-border lending by foreign banks from abroad. The presence
of direct cross-border lending in the nonbank credit measure may hamper the cross-
sectoral focus of this study because it may conflate loans by domestic nonbanks
and foreign banks abroad. To ensure that our measure is picking up only nonbank
credit, we deduct direct cross-border lending from the BIS nonbank credit measure
for those countries and quarters in which data are available. For the quarters in which
data are not available, we deduct the average available share of cross-border lending,
based on an average from the available quarters.5 Overall, direct cross-border lending
amounts to less than 5% of nonbank credit for the aggregate sample of BIS reporting
countries in the quarters for which data are available. But this is not the case for
all individual countries. We therefore remove three countries from our sample for
which the amount of direct cross-border lending was larger than 50%.6 To limit the
influence of outliers, we winsorize all credit-related variables at the 1% level for each
tail of their distribution. After these corrections, movements in the nonbank credit
series are expected to primarily reflect changes in the provision of credit by nonbank
financial institutions, rather than by foreign banks.
Panel A of Table 1 provides summary statistics on bank and nonbank credit
and financial institutions’ assets in AEs and EMEs for the period 1997–2014
5. With thanks to Matthias Drehmann and Stevan Advjiev (BIS) and Win Monroe (IMF) for helpful
advice on these data corrections, and to Linda de Zeeuw (DNB) for compiling and correcting the necessary
data from the BIS consolidated and locational banking statistics.
6. Specifically, we removed Greece, Malaysia, and Saudi Arabia from the sample. We also exclude
Argentina, which experienced a prolonged sovereign distress episode covering much of our sample period.
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TABLE 1
SUMMARY STATISTICS ON CREDIT, MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICIES, AND MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS (MEAN VALUES
ACROSS SUBSAMPLES AND FULL SAMPLE; STANDARD DEVIATIONS IN PARENTHESES)
1997–2014, Quarterly
Advanced economies Emerging market economies Full sample
# Countries 28 9 37
# Observations 2,072 675 2,747
Panel A: Credit series
Bank credit to private sector % of GDP, Source: BIS 84.79 60.41 77.83
(36.86) (42.48) (40.08)




Bank credit, y-o-y % change, Source: BIS 6.47 10.53 7.65
(11.18) (16.35) (13.03)
Nonbank credit, y-o-y % change, Source: BIS 7.33 11.59 8.57
(13.95) (31.87) (20.90)
Total credit, y-o-y % change, Source: BIS 6.68 9.78 7.59
(9.98) (15.10) (11.79)
Panel B: Other macroeconomic variables




Y-o-y real % growth in GDP, Source: IMF-IFS, 3.58 5.59 5.00
(7.48) (7.78) (7.75)
Current account balance, Source: IMF-WEO 1.90 −5.03 −3.04
(11.53) (10.35) (11.15)
General government net lending/borrowing, −0.10 −2.14 −1.54
Source: IMF-WEO (7.28) (5.56) (6.18)
Equity inflows, % of GDP, Source: IMF-IFS 6.17 1.43 2.79
(11.56) (4.81) (7.71)
Debt inflows, % of GDP, Source: IMF-IFS 11.78 1.52 4.47
(33.73) (8.11) (19.89)
Central bank policy rate (in %), Source: IMF-IFS 7.26 16.73 13.82
(4.65) (9.93) (9.70)




GDP per capita, current prices, Source: IMF-WEO 29,042 2,943 10,433
(17,691) (2,951) (15,342)
Banking crisis dummy 0.19 0.03 0.07
(1 = banking crisis, 0 = none): Source: Laeven and
Valencia (2013)
(0.39) (0.16) (0.26)
(1997–2012).7 Banks are an important source of credit in both AEs, where bank
credit is 85% of GDP, and in EMEs, where bank credit is 60% of GDP. Nonbank
credit, on the other hand, is much more important in AEs, comprising 56% of GDP,
7. In our data set, the group of AEs consists of the following countries: Australia, Austria, Bel-
gium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The group of EMEs consists of: Brazil, China,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey.
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TABLE 2











LTV Loan-to-value ratio 32 [18%] Quantity Quantity Borrower









6 [3%] Price Price Lender
LEV Leverage ratio 13 [7%] Quantity Price Lender
SIFI Capital surcharges on
SIFIs
7 [4%] Price Price Lender
INTER Limits on interbank
exposures
16 [9%] Quantity Quantity Lender
CONC Concentration limits 22 [12%] Quantity Quantity Lender
FC Limits on foreign
currency loans
15 [8%] Quantity Quantity Lender
RR Reserve requirement
ratios
12 [7%] Quantity Price Lender
CG Limits on domestic
currency loans
7 [4%] Quantity Quantity Lender
TAX Levy/tax on financial
institutions
17 [9%] Price Price Lender
TABLE 3











LTV CAP Loan-to-value ratio
limits
72 [13%] Quantity Quantity Borrower
IBEX Interbank exposure
limits
24 [4%] Quantity Quantity Lender
RR Reserve requirements 221 [39%] Quantity Price Lender
CONCRAT Concentration limits 32 [6%] Quantity Quantity Lender
SSCB Sector-specific capital
requirements
106 [19%] Price Price Lender
CAP REQ General capital
requirements
100 [18%] Price Price Lender
as opposed to just 9% of GDP in EMEs. Nominal credit growth, measured by year-to-
year percentage changes in the nominal stock of sectoral credit, is on average lower in
AEs than in EMEs. In the former, bank and nonbank credit grew on average by 6.5%
and 7.3% per year, whereas in the latter they grew by 10.5% and 11.6%, respectively.
Total credit has grown by an average annual rate of 6.7% in AEs and 9.8% in EMEs.
1216 : MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING
TABLE 4
MAP AND PM EVENTS BY TYPE AND REGION
2002–8 2009–14 Total
CCL data set 73 72 145
Advanced economies 10 26 36
Quantity-based 10 13 23
Price-based 0 13 13
Emerging market economies 63 46 109
Quantity-based 51 31 82
Price-based 12 15 27
CCFS data set 186 311 497
Advanced economies 44 137 181
Quantity-based 30 48 78
Price-based 14 89 103
Emerging market economies 142 174 316
Quantity-based 101 116 217
Price-based 41 58 99
1.2 MaP Events
We use two data sources for measures of policy actions. First, we use the cross-
country data set of Cerutti, Claessens, and Laeven (2017) (henceforth: CCL), who
create a set of indicator variables that measure the implementation of various MaPs
in 119 countries over 2000–13 at annual frequency. Their database is constructed
from responses to the IMF’s Global Macroprudential Policy Instruments (GMPI)
survey, reported by the participating countries’ financial authorities (IMF 2013).
The analysis covers 12 categories of MaPs, described in Table 2.8 Limits on foreign
currency and domestic currency loans and reserve requirements have been the norm in
EMEs, whereas leverage ratios and limits on interbank exposures are most frequently
applied in AEs. Overall, the most popular MaPs in both AEs and EMEs are LTV
limits, DTI limits, and concentration limits, the latter of which restrict the fraction of
bank assets tied to a particular type of borrower.
Second, we use the cross-country database of Cerutti, Correa, Fiorentino and
Segalla (2017) (henceforth: CCFS). Their focus is on PMs, taking into account both
microprudential and macroprudential objectives, covering five types of prudential
instruments described in Table 3. Their data set covers 64 countries over the period
2000Q1 to 2014Q4, at a quarterly frequency. Like CCL, they rely on the GMPI
survey, but they also use primary sources such as central bank reports. Whereas CCL
gauge the activation of measures, CCFS gauge both the tightening and loosening of
measures. This leads to a much higher number of changes in the overall index.
8. CCL classify measures as financial institution-based or borrower-based. Financial institution-based
policies are those aimed at financial institutions’ assets or liabilities and include, for example, loan-loss
provisioning practices, leverage limits, and capital buffer requirements. Borrower-based measures are
those aimed at borrowers’ leverage and financial positions, and cover, for example, LTV and DTI caps.
Our categorization of price- versus quantity-based measures is described below.
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All policy events, both MaPs and PMs, are measured as dummy variables for
individual measures. The CCL database records the number of MaPs of a particular
type implemented by a country at a given point in time. MaP events are defined
as any increase in the number of MaPs used. The CCFS database records explicit
tightening and loosening measures. We define any tightening as a PM policy event in
the event study analysis, while for the panel regressions we include both tightening
and loosening measures. In total, there are 145 MaPs in the CCL data set, 72% of
which are quantity-based. Most events in AEs are clustered during the period 2009–
14; prior to that MaPs were implemented mostly in EMEs. Meanwhile, there are 497
PM tightening events in CCFS, of which 59% are quantity-based. These events are
distributed somewhat more evenly across AEs and EMEs, with more events in the
postcrisis period, as can be seen in Table 4.
The CCL and CCFS data sets measure only partly overlapping sets of policy
actions. The correlation coefficient between policy activation in both data sets is
approximately 0.5,9 so that differences in results are expected. Ultimately, the choice
of data set depends on the question at hand. CCL focus on measures of a macropru-
dential nature, which matches our research question. CCFS focus on PMs, which also
include measures taken for microprudential purposes, such as general bank capital
requirements.
Neither database gauges the intensity of measures, as all measures are coded as
dummy variables. This is disconcerting given our interest in the boundary problem,
as more binding measures are expected to generate stronger substitution effects (and
nonbinding measures are not expected to generate substitution effects). To address this
issue to some degree, we distinguish between price- and quantity-based measures, as
reported in Tables 2 and 3 for each individual measure. Examples of quantity-based
measures are limits on interbank and foreign currency exposures, both of which
act as a cap on the balance sheet exposures to the particular asset classes, or LTV
caps, which limit the amount of a loan. These measures are designed as a direct
constraint, and could therefore also be seen as a direct intervention in the market.
Price-based policies include countercyclical capital buffers and dynamic provisioning
requirements, which have a more indirect transmission to bank credit through their
effect on the liability side of the balance sheet. The distinction between quantity and
price classifications is admittedly fuzzy in some cases. For example, assuming that
the supply of bank capital is constrained, we classify the leverage ratio as a quantity
measure, since it effectively caps the balance sheet size of the affected entity. A
leverage ratio cap could, however, also be seen as a price-based measure, since the
bank could in principle expand its balance sheet by raising new capital, which would
affect the average cost of funding. We therefore also apply an alternative distinction
between price and quantity measures, which we use as a robustness check. Finally,
we present whether measures are classified as borrower-based or lender-based.
9. This refers to the correlation between the cumulative MaP indices based on the CCL and CCFS
data sets.
1218 : MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING
Inspection of the underlying qualitative answers in the IMF GMPI database in-
dicates that the vast majority of MaPs are aimed at depository institutions (banks),
including the borrower-based measures (for details see Tables 2 and 3). For exam-
ple, most LTV and DTI limits only apply to bank mortgages, but not to mortgages
offered by insurers, pension funds, or investment funds. The additions in the CCFS
database also focus heavily on banking. Our hypotheses on substitution effects be-
tween bank and nonbank credit can therefore be tested by including all MaPs or PMs
simultaneously.
1.3 Macrofinancial Control Variables
We use a number of macroeconomic and financial variables as controls. For in-
stance, we adjust for the occurrence of systemic banking crises by including the
banking crisis indicator of Laeven and Valencia (2013) as a control variable. This
crisis indicator flags those country-quarter observations during which a country ex-
perienced a systemic banking crisis. Since Laeven and Valencia define banking crises
with reference to the use of crisis management tools, such as deposit guarantees and
government recapitalizations of failed banks, the inclusion of this indicator addresses
the concern that our results on MaPs might be picking up the effects of other policies
implemented during the same period of time. Moreover, we include banking system
Z-scores, which measure the distance to default of a country’s banking system, based
on data from the World Bank Global Financial Development Database (GFDD). This
series measures the resilience of banks, which may be an important indicator of
structural systemic risk. Inflation, GDP growth, the current account balance, net gov-
ernment borrowing, capital inflows (debt and equity),10 and central bank policy rates
are taken from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) and International Finan-
cial Statistics (IFS) databases. Central bank assets are taken from the World Bank.
Panel B of Table 1 provides summary statistics for the macroeconomic indicators
used in the regressions.
2. TREND DEVIATIONS FOLLOWING POLICY ACTION
To get a first insight in developments in nonbank credit around policy events, we
start by simply investigating whether growth rates differ from the trend. At this stage,
we do not yet control for the impact of other variables, which we will do in Sections 3
and 3.2. Hence, we calculate the average cumulative nonbank credit growth rates
during the 2-year period before and after policy events. The cumulative growth rates
during the 2-year period before the event act as a baseline. They have been detrended,
that is, adjusted linearly to 0% on average. Next, for the time interval between a and
b periods after policy events, we compute the cumulative excess growth rate (CEGR)
10. In line with Frost and van Tilburg (2014), equity flows are defined as foreign direct investment
plus portfolio equity flows, while debt flows are the sum of portfolio debt and other flows.
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Panel A: Unconditional comparison
CCL database: CCFS database:
CEGR[0,8] = 18.93 (p=0.22) CEGR[0,8] = 19.76*** (p=0.01)
Panel B: Comparison conditional on bank credit below trend
CCL database: CCFS database:
CEGR[0,8] = 20.39* (p=0.09) CEGR[0,8] = 29.35*** (p=0.01)
FIG. 1. Nonbank Credit Growth around Policy Events: Detrending Event Study Method.
NOTES: The figure shows the effects of MaP events on the average cumulative credit growth rates during the 2-year
period following the activation of macroprudential policies. The actual postevent growth rates are adjusted by the linearly
extrapolated growth rates from the 2-year preevent period. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in
parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.





where φi measures the excessive growth in sector S of country C, i periods after
the policy event. Under the null hypothesis of no differences in cumulative growth
rates after policy events, the CEGR of nonbank credit is expected to be statistically
indistinguishable from 0 after policy action. Conversely, to the extent that growth
rates differ, CEGRs may systematically diverge from 0. We test the hypotheses
related to CEGR by performing a series of Wald tests on the sums of coefficients
in the specification. Moreover, we show results conditional on a negative response
in bank credit following policy activation, given that the response is expected to be
higher for binding measures.
Summary results for nonbank credit are shown in Figure 1, for each of the two
data sets and methods. These always show higher cumulative nonbank credit growth
after policy activation, totaling 18.9 and 19.8 pp for the CCL and CCFS data sets
after 2 years. Next, we want to see what happens to nonbank credit when bank credit
appears more constrained. We therefore measure the response in nonbank credit
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growth following MaPs, conditional on bank credit growth being below the preevent
trend. In these circumstances, nonbank credit growth increased by 20.4 and 29.4 pp
in the 2 years after MaP was activated. The results are statistically significant for
both data sets under the conditional approach and for the CCFS data set under the
unconditional approach.
The high numbers for cumulative nonbank credit growth following policy events
may partly be due to the low level of nonbank credit in EME. Table 5 therefore
shows results for AEs and EMEs separately. This confirms that cumulative growth
rates in nonbank credit are lower for AEs than EMEs. Results are more robust
for AEs under the conditional approach, that is, between 8 and 9 pp for both data
sets. Moreover, to put the results for nonbank credit into perspective, those for total
credit and bank credit are also reported. These results indicate that total credit still
decreased following policy events, as the increase in nonbank credit does not offset
the statistically significant, more substantial decrease in bank credit.11
3. PANEL REGRESSIONS
3.1 Baseline Results
The next step is to investigate the effect of MaPs on nonbank credit while control-
ling for the impact of other variables. Several papers have explained bank or total
credit growth, including Cerutti, Claessens and Laeven (2017) who estimate the effect
of MaPs. However, these studies have not explained developments in nonbank credit,
as we do. The regression model is:
ynonbankc,t = ynonbank
′
c,t−1 α + MaPc, t−1β + ybankc,t γ + Controls′c,t−1δ + uc + εc,t ,
where ysc,t denotes a vector of credit growth by sector s (i.e., nonbank or bank) in
country c at time t. The lagged dependent variable captures persistence in nonbank
credit growth. As before, our main variable of interest MaP is a macroprudential
policy index, constructed as the cumulative sum of policy measures, where each
activation adds one unit to the index and each deactivation subtracts one unit from
the index.
We are interested in the substitution effect of macroprudential measures aimed at
bank credit on nonbank credit. We expect this effect to be more pronounced in AEs,
with greater substitution options due to the much larger size of the nonbank financial
sector. We also expect substitution effects to be stronger for tighter measures, that is,
those that constrain bank credit more. We use the same control variables as Cerutti,
Claessens and Laeven (2017), with one difference. In our specification, we control
for developments in bank credit to capture a general component of the credit cycle,
11. Note that the growth rates of nonbank and bank credit do not need to add up to the growth rate for
total credit, given that the size of nonbank and bank credit relative to GDP differs substantially. Generally,
the volume of nonbank credit is smaller than the volume of bank credit (and very small in EMEs), so that
the higher growth rate for nonbank credit usually implies lower nominal growth in absolute terms.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1222 : MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING
and we focus on contemporaneous substitution between bank and nonbank credit.12
This implies that we need to leave out GDP growth, as it is tightly correlated with
bank credit growth and including them both would lead to multicollinearity. The
other control variables are the central bank policy rate and the occurrence of systemic
banking crises. The variable u represents a country-fixed effect and ε is the error
term.
Endogeneity issues may arise in case MaP reacts to the bank credit cycle. Typically,
policy measures are expected during the upturn of the credit cycle, so that a subsequent
decrease in credit may follow from the turning of the credit cycle. Insofar as bank
and nonbank credit are positively correlated, this may also show up as a negative
effect of MaPs on nonbank credit. Note, however, that such an effect would bias
our results downward, while the substitution effect works upward. Moreover, as
indicated, endogeneity issues appear less disconcerting than in estimating intended
effects of MaPs, given that policymakers are unlikely to impose constraints on banks
due to developments in nonbank credit. In any case, to alleviate issues related to
reverse causality, the right-hand side variables are lagged one period (except bank
credit growth, as indicated). We use the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator,
which addresses the Nickel bias on the lagged dependent variable. This methodology
is suitable for independent variables that are not strictly exogenous.
Results are reported in Table 6 for the two data sets, for AEs and EMEs, and
for quantity- and price-based measures. In all specifications, nonbank credit growth
is highly persistent, with a coefficient of 0.7–0.8. The expected positive correlation
with bank credit growth is visible only for EMEs, with a coefficient of 0.2–0.3, which
implies a long-run coefficient of around 1 (i.e., after the short-run dynamics have
played out, e.g., 0.2/(1 – 0.8) = 1). Hence, in EMEs, bank and nonbank credit appear
to comove in the long run. But this appears not to be the case in AEs, where the
coefficient on bank credit growth is either zero (CCFS data set) or negative (CCL
data set) after controlling for the impact of other variables. Moreover, a banking crisis
appears to limit nonbank credit growth as well in most specifications, possibly due
to decreases in credit demand after a banking crisis. Our main variable of interest,
that is, the index for MaPs (CCL database) or PMs (CCFS) database is statistically
significant only for the most evident case of quantity based instruments in AEs. The
coefficients of 0.42 and 0.11 imply a long-run effect of 0.42/(1 – 0.76) = 1.77 and
0.11/(1 – 0.76) = 0.46, respectively. Hence, during the period of activation of a
MaP, annual nonbank credit growth would be roughly 1.8 pp higher, and during the
activation of a PM, it would be roughly 0.5 pp higher. This is a substantial effect
relative to average yearly nonbank credit growth of 7.3% in AEs.
12. Results are robust to including lagged bank credit growth instead of contemporaneous bank credit
growth.
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3.2 Robustness
A variety of robustness checks are conducted for the main result of statistically
significant substitution effects in the case of binding quantity constraints in AEs.
A first robustness check (Table 7) concerns our classification of MaPs and PMs
into quantity-based and price-based measures. An alternative measure of quantity
constraints only includes measures that strictly limit exposures on the asset side of
bank balance sheets (see the alternative classifications in Tables 2 and 3). In this
alternative approach, we classify the leverage ratio and reserve requirement ratios
as price measures, contrary to our initial intuition that these measures are relatively
binding in practice. Results confirm this intuition. Substitution effects of quantity
constraints are still positive, but smaller in size and statistically significant only for
the CCFS database. Another specification is to focus on borrower-based measures
only, that is, LTV and DTI caps. In principle, substitution effects could be more
muted for these measures, given that they can be designed as measures that apply to
both bank and nonbank credit. However, when we consulted the questionnaires for
the CCL responses in the underlying IMF database, we saw that only Canada and the
Netherlands had LTV and/or DTI rules that were explicitly cross-sectoral. Results
are in line with this finding, as they show quantitatively stronger and statistically sig-
nificant effects on nonbank credit for the CCL database (and positive but statistically
insignificant effects on nonbank credit for the CCFS database).
A second robustness test considers the difference between the precrisis and postcri-
sis periods. A large share of MaPs was implemented during and after the GFC. A
related concern is that our baseline results capture not only the effects of MaPs, but
also a host of other factors that took place during that time period. While our previous
analysis tries to control for these factors by explicitly accounting for the presence of
banking crises, changes in monetary policy, and other macroeconomic fundamentals,
there may be remaining omitted factors that affect credit to the private sector and are
also correlated with the timing of MaPs. Another concern related to identification is
that few MaPs were implemented in AEs during the period before the GFC. More
generally, a distinction in precrisis and postcrisis crisis periods leaves us with two
short periods spanning 2000–6 and 2008–15, so that results are subject to larger un-
certainty margins. Results appear to reflect these concerns. For the postcrisis period,
they still show a positive substitution effect of quantity restrictions in AEs for the
CCL database but not for the CCFS database of PMs. Prior to the crisis, the effect
appears to be statistically insignificant, potentially due to the low number of policy
implementations in the sample.
A third robustness check involves the use of annual instead of quarterly data. Using
annual data implies a more ambitious identification test, as it reduces the number of
observations by a factor of 4. But it also checks whether results on substitution effects
hold over longer periods of at least a year. Results in the final columns of Table 7 show
that changing the frequency has a strong impact on the lagged dependent variable, as
it becomes statistically insignificant. But the long-run effect for the effect of MaPs
and PMs is still positive and statistically significant for the CCFS database. Moreover,
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the long-run effect is comparable to our baseline results, that is, 2.01/(1 + 0.19) =
1.69 pp for MaPs (versus 1.77 in the baseline regression) and 0.42/(1 – 0.06) =
0.44 pp for PMs (versus 0.46 in the baseline).
4. PSM
4.1 Methodology
The panel regressions of the previous section have at least two disadvantages. First,
policy action may be endogenous to financial cycle variables, which include credit.
Our argument is that this may be less of an issue for nonbank credit, as policy is
expected to react primarily to bank credit. We can test this assumption by running
a regression that uses policy action as a dependent instead of independent variable,
with bank and nonbank credit as independent variables. Second, the event study
methodology relies on a baseline regression to correct for potential confounding
factors. Yet, this leaves open the possibility of omitted variable bias, particularly for
nonbank credit, where the baseline regression has relatively less explanatory power.
This calls for a methodology that does not rely on a baseline regression for credit,
but directly compares matched observations with and without policy action.
For these reasons, we complement our event study method with a PSM approach.
PSM corrects for sample selection bias due to observable differences between the
treatment and comparison groups. It uses these observable variables (such as credit
cycle variables, banking resilience, and recent crisis experience) to estimate propen-
sity scores, which indicate the likelihood of policy action. The propensity scores are
used to select observations for countries that took policy actions (treatment group)
with similar countries and periods in which the probability of taking policy action
was similar, but no policy action was taken (control group). These observations are
matched and the average differences in CEGRs for the treatment and control groups
can be compared directly. This method provides new evidence of first-stage regres-
sions for MaP action, comparable to, for example, the literature on monetary or fiscal
policy rules.
PSM was introduced in research on medicine (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) and it
has since become popular in macroeconomics. It simulates the effect of a randomized





) ≡ Pr ( c,t = 1|xc,t
) = 	 (α1 + β1xc,t + εc,t
)
,
where p(.)is the propensity score, defined as the probability that the dummy variable
c,t is equal to one. This dummy variable in turn denotes policy action in country c
in quarter t. The probability of policy action is estimated based on xc,t , a vector of
macroeconomic control variables. Finally, 	(.) is the cumulative distribution func-
tion of the standard normal distribution; α1 and β1 are an estimated constant and
coefficient; and εc,t an error term.
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The second stage requires a matching method for selecting nontreatment observa-
tions based on their propensity scores. We start by defining an overlapping support
range for the propensity score, that is, identifying a range of propensities in which
there are sufficient numbers of treatment and nontreatment observations. We then
exclude treatment and control units falling outside the overlapping support range.
Inside the range, we match each treatment unit to up to 10 control units.13
The mean difference in the outcome of interest between the treatment and control
group is called the average treatment effect (ATE). In many applications of PSM, the
outcome being measured is a continuous variable (such as a patient’s blood pressure,
or a country’s GDP growth). In our application it is nonbank credit, for which we apply
a leads-and-lags model (see Atanasov and Black 2016). This model is suitable for
checking pretreatment and posttreatment trends relative to control groups of entities
(in our case countries). Pretreatment trends that are statistically different between
the treatment and control groups may be indicative of anticipation effects. Postevent
trends that are statistically different between both groups correspond to treatment
effects. The ATE is calculated as a CEGR for the eight quarters following policy
action. Hence, the post-MaP CEGR in the treatment group measures the effect of the
MaP action for treated relative to nontreated units.
In order for the PSM estimation to yield unbiased estimates, it is important that
the first stage involves a strong enough goodness of fit that observations can be
accurately matched with similar observations, but not so strong as to perfectly divide
the group into treated observations with high probability of treatment and nontreated
observations with low probability. In other words, there must be enough overlap
between the treatment and control groups that matching of observations is possible.
4.2 Results
The first stage can be estimated with a simple probit regression that takes our
dummies on policy action as the dependent variable. The objectives of MaPs include
addressing the credit cycle (i.e., the time dimension of systemic risk) and increasing
the resilience of the financial system (i.e., the cross-section dimension). For the
time dimension, we use growth in bank and nonbank credit, as well as cross-border
credit. For the cross-section dimension, we use banking sector Z-scores, that is, the
distance to default of a country’s banking system, calculated as a weighted average
of the Z-scores of the country’s individual banks.14 Individual Z-scores compare a
bank’s buffers (capitalization and returns) with the volatility of its returns. Finally, we
include a political economy factor that may influence policy action. This relates to
our observation that MaPs only became politically feasible in many parts of the world
after the economic and social costs of financial crises were actually experienced by
13. The results are relatively insensitive to the number of matched control units.
14. Banking system Z-scores are taken from GFDD. This series measures the resilience of banks,
which is an indicator of structural systemic risk. While the overall resilience of the banking system may
depend on other factors than the resilience of individual banks, such as interdependencies within the
financial network, the authors consider this a valuable proxy.
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CCL database CCFS database
CEGR[0,8] = 10.95*** (p=0.00) CEGR[0,8] = 13.56*** (p=0.00)
FIG. 2. Nonbank Credit Growth around Macroprudential Policy Measures: Propensity Score Matching (PSM) Method.
NOTES: The figure shows the effects of MaP events on the average cumulative credit growth rates during the period
before and after the activation of macroprudential policies. The actual postevent growth rates are adjusted by the linearly
extrapolated growth rates from the 2-year preevent period. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in
parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
country populations. This applies to the Latin American and Asian financial crises
of the 1990s and the GFC of 2007–8. To capture this effect, we include a dummy
variable that signals whether a country has experienced a banking crisis in the past
10 years. As with our panel regression, endogeneity concerns are relevant also here.
Policy action is expected to influence future credit growth, the stability of the banking
system, and the probability of a financial crisis. To mitigate these concerns, we use
a policy variable equal to one if a policy is taken in the following 2 years, which is
equivalent to lagging all of our explanatory variables.
Results as reported in Table 8 confirm our expectations. Bank credit is highly
relevant for the MaPs of the CCL database but not for PMs, which often have a more
institution-specific, microprudential character. Nonbank credit is statistically signifi-
cant in the CCL database, but has a very small economic magnitude (about 10–20%
of the size of bank credit growth). It is not statistically different from zero in the
CCFS database. Finally, resilience as measured by Z-scores and political economy
factors as measured by banking crises also matter for both data sets in the expected
manner. Hence, we use the regression that includes all these variables for calculating
the propensity scores. Treatment observations (i.e., country-quarters where a policy
measure was taken) with propensity scores close to 1, and nontreatment observations
with scores close to 0, are not matched, as there are insufficient comparable observa-
tions in the other group. But in between these two clusters there are ample data that
have similar propensity scores for treated and untreated units.
In the second stage, we analyze the effect of policy action by calculating the average
CEGR of the treatment group relative to the control group. Figure 2 plots the CEGRs
for nonbank credit for both data sets. As in the event study, the trajectory of CEGR
in nonbank credit shows a statistically significant effect: during the 2 years following
policy events, the growth rate of nonbank credit is 11.0 and 13.6 pp above the baseline
for the CCL and CCFS databases, respectively. This finding is statistically significant
with a p-value below 1%. It is also substantially lower than the result for the event
study without control variables (i.e., 18.9 and 19.8 pp, respectively), thus confirming
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the value added of PSM. Moreover, there seems to be some movement before the
formal activation of policies. This could relate to an anticipation in the market of
future movements or, in the case of CCL data, it could relate to measurement issues
around the exact timing of policies within a given year.
Table 9 puts these results for nonbank credit into perspective by distinguishing
between AEs and EMEs, and comparing them to the results for bank and total credit.
As expected, and in line with previous results, effects on cumulative credit growth are
again higher for EMEs than for AEs. While results differ across specifications, the
statistically significant results point to a positive effect on nonbank credit, a negative
effect on bank credit, and a negative effect on overall credit. For AEs, we find that for
the CCL and CCFS databases the cumulative effect is an increase in nonbank credit
growth between 1.8 and 8.7 pp, a decrease in bank credit growth between 5.5 and
6.3 pp, and a decrease in total credit growth between 2.9 and 6.0 pp.
Table 10 shows the distinction between quantity constraints and price measures.
For quantity constraints, the effect on bank credit is negative, substitution effects are
positive, and the overall effect on total credit is negative. For price measures, results
for nonbank credit are broadly in line with those for quantity measures, but results
for bank credit are mixed, as the effect on bank credit is no longer significant (and
even positive in the CCFS database, which is difficult to explain). At the same time,
nonbank credit still increases.
5. CONCLUSION
MaPs are being activated in AEs and EMEs both to increase the resilience of
the financial system and to dampen the financial cycle. Using a battery of empirical
techniques, this paper investigates whether MaPs directed at banks lead to opposite
effects on nonbank credit. Such waterbed effects are expected only when measures
are binding on bank credit, and are expected to be stronger in financial systems in
which there are more options to shift credit provision to the nonbank sector. Properly
identifying such effects is however challenging. Existing measures of policy action
do not indicate the extent to which measures are binding and endogeneity may be
an issue. To address these identification challenges, we have focused on effects on
nonbank credit conditional on a decline in bank credit, and on quantity constraints
that are expected to be more binding and therefore produce stronger substitution
effects. Moreover, to check the robustness of the results, we have used two databases
of policy measures and applied three different methodologies, ranging from trend
deviations to panel regressions and PSM.
Overall, our results indicate substantial substitution effects after MaP measures are
implemented. The results are strongest for trend deviations conditional on a decline
in bank credit. After applying a range of control variables, the findings remain
statistically significant for quantity constraints in AEs. Moreover, the substitution
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effects are clearly visible in a comparison of similar country cases with, and without,
macroprudential measures.
But the results also differ across samples and methodologies and are subject to
large degrees of uncertainty. Clearly, more research is needed to gain more precise
answers. In this context, there is a need for improved data availability and additional
analysis of the effects of MaP on different forms of credit. For example, nonbank
credit data could be improved by filtering out direct cross-border lending by foreign
banks in the BIS database. Future research could address endogeneity issues by
using microdata on bank and nonbank credit. Finally, research could benefit from
more granular measurement of macroprudential and prudential policy measures, in
particular the degree to which a specific measure is binding.
These results raise questions for policymakers on the optimal scope of MaP. On
the one hand, it could be argued that substitution effects engender new systemic risks.
When credit growth shifts away from banks, but households and corporates continue
to accumulate debt, macroeconomic vulnerabilities may continue to rise. This may
eventually prompt a crisis, even if the debt is owed to investment funds or to capital
markets. On the other hand, it could be argued that cross-sector substitution reduces
systemic risks. Nonbank financial institutions are generally less leveraged and have
less liquidity risks than the banking sector; they are also separated from systemic
functions related to the payments infrastructure. Moreover, the nonbank financial
sector generally does not have access to public sector safety nets, such as deposit
insurance and central bank liquidity support. Moral hazard concerns may thus be
lower. In this light, policymakers may welcome a shift to market-based financing,
which can function as a “spare tire” in the supply of credit in times of systemic
banking crises (IMF 2015). In fact, these considerations underlie the proposals for
the creation of a European Capital Markets Union (European Commission 2015).
While our research cannot settle this policy debate, our results suggest substitution
effects need to be taken into account in the design of MaPs.
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